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I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. A JUDGMENT BASED UPON AN ORAL MODIFICATION OF A 
WRITTEN CONTRACT THAT PROHIBITS ORAL MODIFICATION 
CANNOT STAND. 
There is no cause of action in Utah for breach of an oral 
modification of a written contract that prohibits oral 
modification. The subject contract contains clear language that 
the contract could only be modified in writing. While under Utah 
law this language does not prohibit a separate oral contract to 
modify the parties7 relationship, it does protect the integrity of 
the parties' original agreement. 
There is no dispute between the parties that Appellee 
never complied with the provisions of the written contract which 
only allowed modifications in writing. Although Appellee claimed 
a breach of oral contract all the way through trial, he did not 
submit that claim to the jury. Rather, Appellee submitted the 
claim for breach of oral modification. 
Cook raised this issue as an affirmative defense, raised 
it during a parol evidence objection and argued it before the final 
judgment and award of attorney fees was entered. Although, the 
issue may not have been "artfully" preserved, a judgment based on 
a cause of action that doesn't exist cannot stand. 
In any event, the issue cannot be ignored on appeal as it 
relates to attorney fees. After the jury verdict, but before 
attorney fees were awarded, Appellants pointed out to the trial 
court the injustice that would result if a party to a contract that 
expressly stated it could only be modified in writing found himself 
1 
saddled with fees, not for failing to comply with the written 
contract, but for failing to follow terms of an oral modification 
the parties had agreed could not exist. 
B. BEFORE THE COURT WILL AWARD ATTORNEY FEES THE 
PREVAILING PARTY MUST SHOW THAT ATTORNEY FEES WERE 
ACTUALLY INCURRED. 
The court will not award attorney fees unless the party 
seeking them can show he actually paid them or is obligated to pay 
them. The award of attorney fees is compensation not a windfall. 
Cook argued this issue claiming that Appellee had made no 
showing that he paid or was obligated to pay attorney fees. Cook 
argued further that it was probable during this heated contest for 
Cook's Congressional Seat that someone other than Appellee had 
obligated himself to pay them. Although, this issue was placed 
squarely before Appellee, Appellee provided absolutely no evidence 
that he paid or was obligated to do so. Appellee did not even 
provide a statement in his affidavit in support of attorney fees 
that he was obligated to pay. Without evidence in the record of 
payment or obligation to pay, the award of attorney fees must be 
vacated. 
C. COOK PREVAILED ON A PROVISION OF THE WRITTEN 
CONTRACT AND SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES. 
The trial court erroneously applied the "net judgment" 
rule in awarding attorney fees. This court has held that when each 
party has rights under the contract and the contractual provision 
awarding attorney fees awards them for prevailing on "any" 
provision or right then the net judgment rule is inapplicable. 
2 
Each party has a claim of right for attorney fees for the provision 
or right they succeeded in enforcing. 
II. OBJECTION TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee's statement of the case misinterprets the 
integrated written contract which is the subject of this suit. 
There is no support for Appellee's interpretation in the findings 
of the trial court. Even if there were such findings, the parties 
agree that the interpretation of a contract is a question of law to 
which this Court gives no deference to the findings below. Cook 
offers the following in aid of this Court's interpretation of this 
integrated contract. 
Appellee has suggested that the contract was not for full 
campaign services through the convention, primary and general 
election cycles but rather for full services through the convention 
cycle only and limited services through the primary and general 
election cycles. [Brief of Appellee at 3] . This interpretation is 
incorrect. The contract was for full service all the way through to 
the general election. 
The convention cycle is an intensive one-on-one campaign 
to individual delegates. It requires personal delegate contact. 
[Trial Transcript, Day 5, pp. 31-33; Trial Transcript, Day 7 pp. 
230-31.] The parties agreed that Appellee would be paid $40,000.00 
during this two month intensive campaign cycle. [Exhibit 17P, % 
4(b)] . 
Once the convention cycle is successful the labor 
intensive one-on-one ends and the campaign focus shifts to mass 
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media. [Trial Transcript, Day 8, pp. 6-7, 10; Trial Transcript, Day 
5, pp. 31-33; Trial Transcript, Day 7, pp. 230-31.] Fund raising 
now becomes the primary focus of the campaign. The contract 
reflects this focus in paying Appellee 15% of PAC money raised and 
a $4,000 per month fee. [Exhibit 17P, % 4(c)]. If the campaign 
were to be successful it required PAC money thus the contract 
provided that during the primary and general election cycles the 
bulk of Appellee's compensation to be from PAC money. 
There is absolutely nothing in the contract that even 
hints that it was not a full service contract. In light of campaign 
realities, the contract is written to compensate Appellee 
proportionally to the type of labor Appellee contracted to do in 
each cycle of the campaign. [Exhibit 17P, f 4]. In fact, the 
contract states "In particular, Nielson shall oversee all general 
consulting for the campaign." [Id., % 2, emphasis added]. 
Further, the contract allows for bonuses to Appellee upon 
successful election at each stage of the campaign: at the 
convention ($5,000), in the primary election ($5,000), and in the 
general election ($25,000). [Id., % 4(e)]. The contract was 
obviously for full campaign services through the convention, 
primary and general election cycles and not for full services 
through the convention cycle only and limited services through the 
primary and general election cycles. 
Appellee not only misinterprets the written contract, 
Appellee also misrepresents the record about payments that Cook 
made. Appellee suggests Cook acknowledged the validity of invoices 
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by "direct[ing] payments to specific invoices." [Brief of Appellee 
at 4]. This is an incorrect statement of the record. 
Appellee prepared and delivered invoices that were 
correct under the terms of the written contract. Then, later, 
fabricated new invoices. [Cf. Exhibit 23aD with Exhibits 77P, 78P, 
79P; cf. Exhibit 153P with Exhibit 93 P (Invoice 96244); Trial 
Transcript, Day 5, pp. 85-89]. Cook, in the intense heat of the 
political battle, did not personally review the invoices. Cook 
authorized periodic payments owed under the terms of the written 
contract, but did not direct them to particular invoices. The 
actual payments were made by a secretary, who arbitrarily assigned 
payments to invoices. [Trial Transcript, Day 7, pp. 49-56, 92, 98, 
124, 127-28, 151-52]. 
In complete disregard for the truth of what the record 
shows, Appellee claims the jury found Cook to have breached the 
written contract. [Brief of Appellee, at 26, n. 4]. Appellee 
cites Exhibit 153P for the proposition that Cook failed to pay 
$2,086.00 of the $40,000.00 of the pre-convention portion of the 
contract. Exhibit 153P actually shows that the $40,000.00 was 
completely paid in installments. The $2,086.00 was part of 
Appellee's claimed "oral modification." [Trial Transcript, Day 2, 
pp. 95-96]. 
III. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ADDRESS ALL ISSUES ON 
APPEAL, EVEN IF SOME WERE OMITTED FROM THE ORIGINAL 
DOCKETING STATEMENT. 
Appellee argues that Cook is barred from appealing the 
trial court's award of attorney fees because Cook failed to include 
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this issue m his original docketing statement. [Brief of Appellee 
at 29-31]. Appellee is wrong. 
The original final judgment, entered May 31, 2 000, did 
not include an award of attorney fees. Cook filed the original 
docketing statement on July 20, 2000. The original judgment was 
vacated by che trial court. [R2356-2360] . On December 22, 2000 
the trial court entered a new judgment which included attorney 
fees. Cock filed a new timely notice of appeal. This court 
notified Cock of the briefing schedule which was based on the first 
appeal. Upon advice of the Clerk, Cook moved the court to 
consolidate the two appeals in order to keep the briefing schedule. 
The Clerk specifically advised Cook that a new docketing statement 
was unnecessary. Nevertheless, upon Appellee making it an issue, 
Cook amended the docketing statement. 
In Nelson ex. rel. Struckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 
568 (Utah 1596) , this Court noted " [t]he docketing statement is for 
the benefit of the Court, not the appellee". Thus, Appellee cannot 
claim it was prejudiced by any deficiency in the docketing 
statement, since the docketing statement is not for Appellee's 
benefit. 
Appellee cites only Brooks v. Department of Employment 
Security, 735 P.2d 241, (Utah App. 1987), a two paragraph decision 
of the Court of appeals, which is clearly distinguishable. [Brief 
of Appellee at 29] . The Court of Appeals dismissed that case 
because the appellant did not amend the docketing statement 
although the Court of Appeals instructed the appellant to amend it. 
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Indeed, Rule 9 jurisprudence is replete with authority that issues 
may be added to a docketing statement by amendment without 
prejudice to the appellee. In Nelson, the Court noted: 
"We see no merit in the [appellee's] argument 
that [the appellant's] failure to list all 
issues presented for review in his original 
docketing statement dooms his appeal. [The 
appellant] filed timely notices of appeal from 
both trial court orders. He then submitted a 
docketing statement . . . [The appellant] 
subsequently filed an amended docketing 
statement that included the other issues 
presented for appeal. [The appellee] moved to 
strike the statement for being untimely filed. 
The issues [the appellant] targeted for appeal 
were stated in his amended docketing statement 
and were thoroughly discussed in his brief. 
. . . In short, [the appellant's] failure to 
list all issues for review in the docketing 
statement did not affect his right to raise 
later specified issues for appeal. 
Accordingly, Appellee is not prejudiced by the amended 
docketing statement and Cook is not barred from appealing the trial 
Court's award of attorney fees. 
IV. A JUDGMENT BASED ON A NON-EXISTENT CAUSE OF ACTION CANNOT 
BE ALLOWED TO STAND. 
The parties both agree that ,?[w]hether the Services 
Agreement in this case could be orally modified is a question of 
law with no deference given to the trial court's ruling." Brief of 
Appellee at 1.] Likewise, there is no dispute that whether or not 
a contract that can be modified was in fact modified is a question 
of fact, and that findings of fact that are clearly erroneous must 
be set aside. Id. 
The parties diverge on the answer to both the legal and 
the factual question. While it is true in Utah that a provision in 
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a contract that prohibits oral modification of the contract will 
not stop the parties from entering into a new oral contract on the 
same subject matter, the courts of this state have never condoned 
the violence that is done to the parties' expectations by simply 
ignoring that provision of the contract.1 
As to the factual issue, Appellee, under questioning from 
his own lawyer, admitted that the parties to this agreement had 
never complied with paragraph 15 of their agreement which only 
allowed modifications of the agreement if they were in writing. 
[Trial Transcript, Day 2, pp. 165-66]. Given this admission of a 
party it was not necessary for Defendant to further marshal the 
facts. If the contract, as a matter of law, can only be modified 
in writing, and Appellee admits it was not modified in writing, any 
factual finding that the contract was properly modified was clearly 
erroneous. See, e.g. , Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P. 2d 727 (Utah 1982) 
(jury verdict cannot stand where undisputed facts preclude 
finding). 
A. THIS COURT CANNOT ALLOW A JUDGMENT ON A NON-
EXISTENT CAUSE OF ACTION TO STAND, EVEN IF THE 
ISSUE WAS UNARTFULLY PRESERVED BELOW. 
Cook is not, on this appeal, arguing that the trial court 
simply gave an erroneous instruction. Rather, this is a case where 
a judgment was entered on a cause of action that did not exist 
(oral modification to an agreement the parties agreed could not be 
1
 Plaintiff suggests that this question is one of first 
impression. It is not. This Court as far back as 1932 explained 
that, although, a new contract could be entered into, the provision 
preventing oral modification would be enforced. Salzner v. Jos. J. 
Snell Estate Corp., 16 P.2d 923, 925 (Utah 1932). 
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orally modified) . The fact that this cause of action does not 
exist in Utah was squarely brought to the trial court's attention, 
after the jury verdict but before entry of judgment, in the post-
trial motions. The Court ignored the issue.2 While, as this Court 
put it in State v. Haston, 846 P. 2d 1276, (Utah 1993) the 
preservation of the issue may have been "tardy and unartful" the 
issue was sufficiently preserved to allow this Court to vacate a 
judgment on a non-existent cause of action.3 
When judgment is entered on a cause of action that does 
not exist, it simply cannot be allowed to stand. See State v. 
Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993). Judgment cannot properly be 
entered on a jury verdict that does not support a cause of action, 
and the issue can be pursued on appeal even though no motion was 
made below. Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 310 n. 7 
(10th Cir. 1985) ("A party need not have moved for a directed 
verdict in order to question on appeal whether the judgment was a 
proper one to enter on a special verdict.") 
2
 The issue had previously been raised as an affirmative 
defense, [R73] was acknowledged by Plaintiff's testimony in the 
trial, where he admitted there was no written modification but 
thumbed his nose at the contract he authored, [Trial Transcript, 
Day 2, pp. 165-66] and the issue was raised, but rejected by the 
Court's overruling of Defendants' parol evidence objection. [Trial 
Transcript, Day 2, pp. 83-84]. 
3
 In Haston a criminal case in which the defendant was 
convicted of a crime that did not exist, the defendant did not 
raise the issue until on appeal, and then only in a footnote. 
Haston, 846 P. 2d at 1277. In any event, this issue was not tardily 
raised as it relates to an award of attorney fees under this 
contract. Before there had been any finding as to attorney fees 
this issue was squarely presented to the trial court who ignored 
the issue. [R2028-2040, R2232-2242, R 2450-2460]. 
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This case is a good candidate for the application of this 
principle. Two very sophisticated men, bargaining over something 
as fundamental as the processes by which our members of Congress 
are elected, chose to memorialize their agreement in writing. They 
further stabilized the agreement by agreeing that the written 
contract cannot be modified except in writing. The contract was 
drafted by R.T. Nielson. He admitted in open court that the 
provision was not met. At the last minute, for tactical reasons, 
he withdrew from the jury the legally recognized cause of action, 
i.e., was there an oral contract supplementing these parties' 
written unmodified agreement, and instead only submitted a question 
that both parties now agree can be answered as a legal question, 
i.e., whethei: this contract can be orally modified. Having made 
this tactical decision in his greed to collect attorney fees, 
Appellee should not be allowed to uphold this verdict on a 
nonexistent claim when the recognized claim could have been, but at 
Appellee's request was not, submitted to this jury. 
B. IN UTAH NO CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS FOR ORAL 
MODIFICATION OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT THAT ITSELF 
• ' PRECLUDES ORAL MODIFICATION. 
Appellee misstates the holding of five Utah cases trying 
to support the proposition that a written contract that expressly 
forbids oral modification can be orally modified anyway. [Brief of 
Appellee at 17-20] . Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc. , 348 P.2d 337 (Utah 
1960); Prince v. R.C. Tolman, 610 P.2d 1267 (Utah 1980); Fisher v. 
Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172 (Ut. App. 1995); Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 
8 6 (Utah 1963); PLC Landscape Const, v. Picadilly Fish 'N Chips, 
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Inc. , 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1972) . None of these 
cases support that proposition. The cases do allow parties whose 
contracts prohibit oral modification of their written agreement to 
enter into new agreements on the same subject matter. This is 
allowed precisely because it is a new agreement, not a modification 
of the written contract. 
The case of Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 348 P. 2d 337 
(Utah 1960) clearly explains this distinction. In that case the 
parties entered into a supply contract under which specified 
amounts of roofing materials were to be supplied at an agreed upon 
price. Additional material under the contract could only be 
ordered upon written authorization. After these agreements were 
entered the project was expanded and the defendant ordered more 
materials without the required written authorization. This Court 
held the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the 
additional materials, not because parties are allowed to ignore 
material provisions they have agreed to, but "because the parties 
actually entered into a new agreement. . . . "4 The Court granted 
a new trial, which was also appealed. Davis v. Payne & Day, Inc., 
363 P.2d 498 (Utah 1961). In the second appeal the Court made it 
crystal clear why the plaintiff was given judgment. 
. . .What was done need not necessarily be 
regarded as an attempt to vary or obviate the 
terms of the written contract . . . 
[defendants] could and did enter into a 
4
 The Davis case relied upon Salzner v. Jos. J. Snell Estate 
Corp. , 16 P.2d 923, 925 (Utah 1932) which held that the contractual 
prohibition against oral modification "does not apply to work done 
pursuant to alterations made by a subsequent agreement." 
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separate contract to purchase these additional 
materials. 
Id. at page 4 99. 
That is Cook's position in this case. Paragraph 15 of 
the parties' agreement did not prevent proof of "a new agreement" 
for additional services on the campaign, but it did preclude a 
cause of action for oral modification of this agreement.5 
The cases cited by Appellee are not to the contrary. In 
Prince v. R.C. Tolman, 610 P. 2d 1267 (Utah 1980) this Court 
affirmed the same principle that the provision in the original 
contract that modifications need to be in writing does not preclude 
a separate and subsequent agreement. In that case the plaintiff 
would have performed his subcontract "except for defendant's 
supplemental and separate agreement. . ." which the Court found 
enforceable. 
Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172 (Ut. App. 1995) stands 
only for the proposition, irrelevant to this matter, that a written 
contract that does not contain prohibition on oral modification can 
be orally modified. 
Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86 (Utah 1963) was a case in 
which parties to a written contract modified that contract with a 
new written contract, also irrelevant to this matter. 
There is no support in Utah law for the proposition that 
the parties' express limitation on oral modification can be 
5
 In fact, these parties contemplated that additional 
services could be purchased as part of separate agreements. 
[Exhibit 17P, % 4]. 
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ignored. Appellee in apparent desperation to maintain this 
insupportable position misquotes a case, seeking to hide the 
misquote by omitting proper brackets or ellipses. [Brief of 
Appellee at 19-20] . PLC Landscape Const, v. Picadillv Fish 'N 
Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1972) only 
appears to support Appellee's position because Appellee only quoted 
half a sentence. PLC involved only oral contracts. In PLC, 
plaintiff claimed an original oral contract and a subsequent oral 
modification of that oral contract. In those circumstances the 
court held: 
Except where a change, modification or 
addition to a contract may conflict with the 
well-recognized rule against varying a written 
contract by parol, there is nothing so 
sacrosanct about having entered into one 
agreement that it will prevent those parties 
entering into any such change, modification, 
extension or addition to their arrangement for 
doing business with each other as they may 
mutually agree. (Emphasis added). 
Appellee in his quote left out the underlined portion which 
directly contradicts Appellee's position. In fact, each of the 
cases cited by Appellee involve separate and independent contracts 
or are completely irrelevant to this matter. 
Reading all these cases honestly, a clear tenet of Utah 
law becomes apparent. In Utah we respect, to the fullest measure 
possible, the freedom we have as a people to contract and to have 
our contractual expectations fulfilled. Phone Directories Co. Inc. 
v. Henderson, 8 P. 3d 256 (Utah 2000) . Unless the law or the party's 
agreement otherwise limit, a party's written agreement can be 
modified orally or in writing. But, if the parties have agreed not 
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to modify the agreement except in writing that agreement not to 
modify orally will be respected. In that circumstance a party can 
recover only if he proves a subsequent and independent oral 
contract. 
Unless these cardinal rules are followed the parties 
reasonable expectations are thwarted --as occurred in this case. 
In this case, there is no finding of an independent and subsequent 
oral contract, but the legally irrelevant finding of an oral 
modification. 
C. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY 
AN ORAL MODIFICATION WHERE THE WRITTEN CONTRACT 
EXPRESSLY PROHIBITS ORAL MODIFICATIONS. 
In Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. P.J. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 
(Utah 1985) the Court denied an award of attorney fees because the 
party seeking them prevailed on an oral contract subsequent to the 
written contract. The subsequent oral contract was an accord and 
satisfaction which did not provide for attorney fees if breached. 
The prevailing party argued that because the written contract 
provided for attorney fees he should be awarded attorney fees. 
While the Court enforced the subsequent oral contract (finding that 
the statute of frauds didn't prohibit a subsequent oral agreement) 
it would not award attorney fees for breach of the oral contract 
because the oral contract did not provide for attorney fees. 
The concept is clear. This court will allow separate oral 
contracts to be enforced notwithstanding a contractual prohibition 
to oral modification of the statute of frauds as in the Golden Key 
case. But it will not allow an award of attorney fees for breach 
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of a claimed separate oral contract based upon a provision in the 
written contract. The oral modification is a separate contract and 
if attorney fees are awarded they must be provided for in the oral 
modification. 
Before the trial court entered judgment and before any 
decision was made on attorney fees, Cook alerted the trial court to 
the unambiguous law of Utah that written contracts which prohibit 
oral modifications cannot be orally modified, though a separate 
oral agreement can be enforced. [R2028-2040, R2232-2242, R2450-
2460]. A review of the trial court's award of attorney fees for 
breach of the oral modification reveals the poignancy of the wrong 
done Cook. 
The parties entered a written contract. They agreed it 
could only be modified in writing. They also agreed that if any 
provision of the written contract were enforced, the prevailing 
party would be awarded its attorney fees. The parties had 
expectations based upon the written contract. Cook's contractual 
expectations were trampled. 
The jury actually found in favor of Cook on the written 
contract. [R1945-1946]. The court, however, awarded only plaintiff 
attorney fees, not based upon the written contract but upon the 
oral modification. This, even though Appellee, from the witness 
stand, proudly admitted that the oral modification was not in 
writing as the parties had agreed. [Trial Transcript, Day 2, pp. 
165-66]. 
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The trial court ignored the law and the parties' 
agreement and awarded attorney fees to Appellee, doubling the size 
of the judgment. 
V. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE VACATED WHERE THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND NO FINDING BY THE COURT 
THAT APPELLEE EITHER PAID OR IS OBLIGATED TO PAY ATTORNEY 
FEES. 
Appellee has produced no evidence, no testimony, no 
documentation, absolutely nothing to substantiate the claim that he 
paid or is obligated to pay attorney fees. [R2450-2560]. It has 
been assumed that because legal representation was provided 
Appellee, and even quantified by affidavit, that Appellee is 
entitled to a judgment for "attorney fees." 
Cook has cited three Utah cases that refute this 
assumption. Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467 (Utah 1992); Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996); 
Soft solutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 1 P. 3d 1095 (Utah 
2000) . The last of the trilogy clarifies the rule. An award of 
attorney fees can only be made if attorney fees were actually 
incurred. Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d 
at 1105, (Utah 2000). "Paid," "incurred," or "obligated" is the 
question. 
This Court laid down the rule that an "attorney fee" is 
a monetary obligation paid or owed from the client to the attorney. 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d at 1375 
(Utah 1996) . 
Before judgment in this case was entered, Cook argued 
that Appellee had provided no evidence that he had paid or owed any 
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attorney fees. [R2450-2460] . That, in this charged political 
environment it was possible, even probable, that a political 
opponent of Appellants was paying, or had obligated itself to pay, 
Appellee's attorney fees. In response to Cooks' objection, 
Appellee's attorney quantified by affidavit the time spent but 
conspicuously provided no evidence that Appellee had paid or was 
obligated to pay any fees. 
No evidence was provided in response to Appellants' 
direct assertion that no fees were owed or paid. No representation 
agreement was provided. No contingency fee agreement was provided. 
No billing statement was provided. No cancelled check showing 
payment was provided. Not even a statement in the affidavit 
averring Appellee was obligated to pay. Such omission, when just 
such a statement was made an issue by Cook, is affirmative evidence 
that Appellees did not pay any fee nor were they obligated to pay 
any fee. 
In this case, where the court could easily take notice of 
Cooks' numerous political opponents, iz is by no means improbable 
that someone other than Appellee is obligated to pay attorney fees. 
Without evidence of either payment: or obligation to pay 
there is no legal basis to affirm an award cf attorney fees. When 
there is neither support for the award in the findings of the court 
nor in the record, the award must be vacated. Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988); Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 
(Utah App. 1992) . 
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Further, attorney fees recoverable by contract are only 
allowed in accordance with the terms of the contract. Travner v. 
Cushincr, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). This contract provides: 
"The prevailing party to any litigation brought to enforce any 
provision of this Agreement shall be awarded its costs and 
attorneys fees." [Exhibit 17P, % 14, emphasis added]. Appellee 
can only be awarded its attorney fees, not fees it never paid and 
was never obligated to pay. 
VI. COOK SHOULD RECEIVE AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE HE 
PREVAILED IN ENFORCING A PROVISION OF THE WRITTEN 
CONTRACT. 
Obviously if this Court reverses the judgment in favor of 
Appellee, and/or if the Court finds that the contract in this case 
does not contemplate recovery of fees for breach of an oral 
modification the contract prohibited, Cook was entitled to recover 
his fees. But even if Appellee's judgment were left intact, the 
trial court erred in refusing Cook's fee application. 
In refusing to award attorney fees to Cook, the trial 
court made the error warned against in Mountain States Broadcasting 
Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1989). Instead cf taking a 
"flexible and reasoned approach, the court mechanically applied" 
the "net judgment" rule, using it as an ending, not a starting 
point. Id. at 557. Indeed, she simply denied Cook his fees under % 
14 of the Services Agreement: "Defendant's Motion for an Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs is denied. Appellee was the prevailing 
party in this lawsuit and is the only party who may be entitled to 
an award of fees and costs in this matter." [R2191-2192] . 
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Case law in this state makes it clear that the mechanical 
approach is improper. Each case must be evaluated on its own 
facts, (Occidental/Nebraska Federal Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 
221 (Utah App. 1990)), with particular regard to the language of 
the contract the parties have adopted. Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). When analyzed, the 
language of the parties' contract in this case leads to the 
conclusion that the "net judgment" rule has no application.6 These 
parties agreed: 
Attorneys Fees. The prevailing party to any 
litigation brought to enforce any provision of 
this Agreement shall be awarded its costs and 
attorneys fees. (Emphasis added). 
Exhibit 17 P, % 14. 
In Brown v. Richards 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992), 
attorney fees clauses in independent contracts forming a single 
transaction were found to trigger separate awards of attorney fees 
where the contracts provided for attorney fees to the prevailing 
party in suits "brought to enforce the provisions of this 
agreement." Id. at 154. The court reasoned that since the clause 
referred to "this agreement", and more than one agreement was 
involved, separate awards were proper for enforcement of each 
agreement. See also, Elder v. Triax Company, 740 P.2d 1320 (Utah 
6
 The trial court and Plaintiff both have relied on 
calculations purported to show percent victory for each party. 
[Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re Attorneys Fees; Brief 
of Appellee at 45, 47-49 and n. 22] . This type of analysis was 
rejected in Brown, 840 P. 2d at 155. There is no basis in Utah for 
using calculations to determine the prevailing party. 
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1987) (Plaintiff need not await outcome of counterclaim to receive 
fee award because of independent sources of fee award). 
If Appellee's claims are allowed to stand, they can only 
stand as separate independent contracts. (see, section IV, supra), 
thus making the Brown analysis applicable and application of the 
net judgment rule erroneous. Cook prevailed under the terms of the 
written contract, and is entitled to his attorney fees, even if 
this court allows Appellee's judgment under the oral modification 
agreement to stand. 
Further, even if the oral modification and the written 
contract is taken to be a single contract, Cook would still be 
entitled to his attorneys fees for the claims on which he was 
successful. "Attorney fees are awardable only if provided for by 
statute or contract and, if by contract, only as the contract 
allows by its terms." Mountain States, at 555. The attorney fees 
provision here is significantly different than the provision in 
Mountain States. The attorney fees provision at issue in Mountain 
States stated: "In the event of commencement of suit by either 
party to enforce the provisions of this Agreement, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to receive attorneys' fees and costs as a 
court may adjudge reasonable in addition to any other relief 
granted." Mountain States, at 555, (emphasis added). Thus, the 
attorney fees provision was to be triggered with reference to the 
entire contract. 
By contrast, the clause in this contract allows attorney 
fees to "[t]he prevailing party [in] litigation brought to enforce 
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any provision of this Agreement." Exhibit 17P, 1(14, emphasis 
added. The parties agreed that attorney fees would be triggered 
with reference to individual provisions, not to the contract as a 
whole. At most, Appellee was successful on claims arising out of 
the provisions of an oral modification of the written contract, 
Cook was successful on claims arising out of completely separate 
provisions of the written agreement relating to repayment of 
expenses. Thus, Cook is the prevailing party in litigation brought 
to enforce certain provisions of the agreement, and is thus 
entitled to his costs and attorney fees under the specific language 
of the parties contract. 
This result is compelled by the reasoning in Trayner v. 
Cushing, 688 P. 2d 856 (Utah 1984) . In Trayner, the parties entered 
into a contract with an attorney fees clause stating, "If either 
party fails to [carry out and fulfill the terms specified] he 
agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing this agreement, or any 
right arising out of breach thereof, including attorney's fees." 
Id. , at 857, emphasis added. As in this case, the attorney fee 
provision in Trayner was triggered not only with reference to the 
agreement taken as a whole, but with reference to any right arising 
out of it. As in this case, the parties in Trayner each won some 
relief from the other. As in this case, the trial court in Trayner 
awarded attorney fees only to the "net judgment" winner. This 
Court reversed. 
Preliminary to finding both parties were entitled to 
attorney fees, this Court noted that " [a] party is entitled to 
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those fees attributable to the successful vindication of 
contractual rights within the terms of their agreement." Trayner, 
at 858. After analyzing the attorney fee provision, and finding it 
triggered by enforcement of "any" right arising out of the 
contract, the Court found each party "enforced" the agreement 
against the other: 
Each of these parties had rights under the 
agreement that were denied him by the other. 
Each was required to take legal action to 
enforce the agreement in one or more 
particulars. Each was successful on one or 
more points and unsuccessful on others. Each 
was therefore entitled to an award for 
successfully enforcing the agreement against 
the other. 
Trayner, at 858. 
Even if Appellee's judgment against Cook stands, Cook had 
rights under their agreement that were denied him by the Appellee. 
Cook was required to take legal action to enforce provisions of the 
agreement in one or more particulars. Cook was successful on one 
or more points and unsuccessful en others. Cook is therefore 
entitled to an award of attorney fees for successfully enforcing 
the provisions of the agreement against Appellee. Trayner is 
factually and legally so similar tc this case, the holding in that 
case can be applied verbatim here: 
The court was in error m making this award, 
both in failing to recognize that some part of 
the time charged by plaintiff's attorney was 
spent in defending the counterclaim on which 
he was not successful and in failing to award 
defendant any fees for enforcing his rights 
under the contract." 
Trayner, at 858. 
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The case should be remanded with instructions to award Cook the 
attorney fees incurred in enforcing those provisions on which he 
was successful. 
VII. THE COURT CANNOT UPHOLD THIS JUDGMENT ON AN ALTERNATIVE 
THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
Appellee argues that the trial court's invalid oral 
modification judgment can be upheld on the alternative theory of 
unjust enrichment. [Brief of Appellant at 25]. 
While it may be true that in some circumstances the 
appellate courts can uphold a trial court on any valid basis, even 
if the trial court erred on the basis it selected, this Court 
cannot uphold the trial court on the basis of unjust enrichment. 
Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine. As such it 
can only be invoked when there is no adequate remedy at law. When 
the parties have entered into an express agreement their remedy is 
at law, and an alternative equitable remedy such as unjust 
enrichment is not available. UTCO v. Sharpe, 2 001 Ut. App. 117, 
419 Utah Adv. Rep.7 (Utah App. 2001) and cases cited therein. 
In this case the parties entered into a written 
agreement. Their remedy is at law. The court cannot uphold the 
judgment under the equitable theory of unjust enrichment. 
VIII. APPELLEE'S WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND PART PERFORMANCE ARGUMENT 
DOES NOT SAVE THIS ORAL MODIFICATION THAT WAS NOT REDUCED 
TO WRITING BECAUSE APPELLEE DID NOTHING THAT WAS NOT 
REFERABLE TO THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT. 
Part performance, in order to replace the requirement of 
a writing, must be exclusively referable to the supposed oral 
agreement. Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983) . In Martin 
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the plaintiff had worked long hours each day for 3 0 years for a 
rancher, claiming that he did so based on an oral agreement that 
the ranch would be conveyed to him. The trial court entered 
judgment for the worker. This Court reversed the trial court's 
decision, finding that the actions of the plaintiff were not 
exclusively referable to the supposed oral modification of the 
employment agreement. The Court found that long hard days were 
typical of ranch work and plaintiff was being paid a salary for 
that work. 
Similarly, in this case Appellee, in the written 
contract, agreed to work during the convention cycle for $40,000.00 
and thereafter through the primary and general election cycles for 
15% of the PAC money raised plus $4,000.00 per month. [Exhibit 17p 
K 4.] This agreement was typical of political consulting 
agreements. The pre-convention work is labor intensive with much 
one-on-one work with convention delegates. Thereafter the focus 
shifts from the labor intensive work to fund raising and media 
spending. Thus, all of the work performed by Appellee that he 
claims is "part performance" is referable to the written agreement. 
Part performance will not permit this judgment to stand. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The judgment in favor of Appellee for $162,962.0 0 was 
based on a cause of action that does not exist in Utah--oral 
modification of a written contract which prohibits oral 
modification--and therefore should be vacated. The judgment in 
favor of Appellee for attorney fees in the amount of $195,8 00.83 
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should be vacated because it was based on Appellee prevailing on a 
non-existent cause of action and because Appellee presented 
absolutely no evidence that he paid or was obligated to pay the 
fees. 
Cook prevailed on his claim for breach of the written 
contract. The court should remand the case to the trial court for 
a determination of attorney fees under the terms of the written 
contract. Even if this court finds that Appellee's judgment for 
breach should stand, Cook is entitled to an award of attorney fees 
because the trial court erroneously applied the "net judgment" 
rule. 
DATED this L^ ' day of May, 2001. 
ATKIN & HAWKINS, P.C. 
BLAKE S. ATKIN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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